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Poison Murder and Expert Testimony:
Doubting the Physician in Late
Nineteenth-Century America
Mark Essig*
By most historical accounts, the years around 1900 witnessed the
triumph of the expert, as the Jacksonian era's egalitarian suspicion of
specialized knowledge was replaced by a respect bordering upon
awe. "[T]he last third of the nineteenth century saw the virtual over-
throw of effective resistance to specialization," John Higham has
written. "By 1920... America had embraced the specialist and sanc-
tified the expert with an enthusiasm unmatched elsewhere."'
Physicians often occupy a starring role in this narrative of trium-
phant expertise. After half a century of professional disarray, doctors
at the turn of the twentieth century built a remarkably powerful and
prestigious professional organization and won control over edu-
cation, licensing, drug distribution, and other aspects of medical
practice. 2 An older school of medical history attributed the profes-
sion's new social power to scientific advances: as the effectiveness of
medicine increased, so did its social authority. More recent histories
have pointed out that medicine's advances in cultural authority
preceded and outstripped therapeutic advances. By this account, a
few notable medical and scientific breakthroughs-including a
vaccine for rabies and a drug for syphilis-convinced the public that
medicine was worthy of respect even when its claims to therapeutic
* This Article is adapted from my doctoral thesis, Science and Sensation: Poison Murder
and Forensic Medicine in Nineteenth-Century America (2000) (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell
University). For their generous assistance with earlier drafts of this project, my thanks to R.
Laurence Moore, Joan Jacobs Brumberg, Peter Dear, and Michael Kammen.
1. John Higham, The Matrix of Specialization, in THE ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN
MODERN AMERICA, 1860-1920, at 5 (Alexandra Oleson & John Voss eds., 1979); see also
BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1976).
2. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982);
WILLIAM G. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: FROM
SECTS TO SCIENCE 79-144 (1972).
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authority were suspect. "Bolstered by genuine advances in science
and technology," Paul Starr writes, "the claims of the professions to
competent authority became more plausible, even when they were
not yet objectively true; for science worked even greater changes on
the imagination than it worked on the processes of disease."3
Medical authority, in other words, depended largely on good public
relations.
Historians who have studied press coverage of science and medi-
cine during this period have found that scientists and physicians were
portrayed as heroes. These images, some claim, boosted the public
standing of the profession. 4 1 would like to suggest that this interpret-
ation reflects a bias in the topics chosen for study. It is not surprising
that press accounts of a medical success such as the rabies cure
should provoke enthusiasm for science and medicine. But there was
also another type of news story in which medicine played a
prominent role: the sensational criminal trial. Doctors and scientists
were called upon to testify about the mental health of defendants,
various types of wounds, and-with surprising frequency-the
chemical or physiological signs of criminal poisoning. In calling upon
expert witnesses to try to resolve criminal disputes, the courts played
an important role in shaping what science and medicine meant for
the general public.5 The adversarial nature of the criminal trial guar-
anteed contradictory expert testimony, and these highly publicized
spectacles of scientific disagreement presented an unflattering image
of science and medicine.6
Most previous historical studies of medical expert testimony have
focused on the insanity defense.7 But from the nineteenth century
3. STARR, supra note 2, at 18. Other advances included new bacteriological tests, vaccines
for typhoid and tetanus, antiseptic surgery, and technological advances such as x-rays and
stethoscopes. Id at 134-37. See also John Harley Warner, Ideals of Science and Their Discon-
tents in Late Nineteenth-Century Medicine, 82 Isis 454 (1991).
4. See Bert Hansen, America's First Medical Breakthrough: How Popular Excitement
About a French Rabies Cure in 1885 Raised New Expectations for Medical Progress, 103 AM.
HIST. REV. 373 (1998); see also JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, TYPHOID MARY: CAPTIVE TO THE
PUBLIC'S HEALTH (1996); MARCEL C. LA FOLLETrE, MAKING SCIENCE OUR OWN: PUBLIC
IMAGES OF SCIENCE, 1910-1955 (1990); Matthew D. Wahlen & Mary F. Tobin, Periodicals and
the Popularization of Science in America, 1860-1910, 3 J. AM. CULTURE 195 (1980); TERRA
ZIPORYN, DISEASE IN THE POPULAR AMERICAN PRESS: THE CASE OF DIPHTHERIA,
TYPHOID FEVER, AND SYPHILIS, 1870-1920 (1988).
5. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA, at xvi (1995).
6. This Article blurs the distinctions between science and medicine. This is justified
because the medical specialty under consideration, toxicology, was closely allied with analytical
chemistry. In addition, my topic is the place of science and medicine in popular culture, and
newspapers and popular journals rarely made a distinction between the two in their coverage
of poisoning trials.
7. E.g., CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN GUITEAU: PSYCHIATRY
AND LAW IN THE GILDED AGE (1968); ROGER SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND
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through the first few decades of the twentieth, some of the most
celebrated cases involving expert testimony were poison murder
trials.' The problems of expert testimony in poisoning trials seemed
more troubling to the medical profession than did those involving
insanity. A public long scornful of the "insanity dodge" did not
expect alienists to agree on the mental state of a defendant. But
because toxicology, closely related to chemistry, was considered an
"objective" science, a failure of toxicologists to agree seemed to call
into question the certainty of scientific knowledge. These disagree-
ments had important implications for the public image of scientific
and medical experts at the end of the nineteenth century.
After briefly outlining the nineteenth-century obsession with
poisoning crimes, this Article discusses attempts by physicians,
scientists, and lawyers to reform the system of taking expert testimo-
ny at the turn of the century. It then examines the expert testimony
at the 1893 poison murder trial of Robert Buchanan in Manhattan. I
treat the conflict of expert testimony in this trial as a battle over
scientific knowledge and credibility, and I analyze the ways in which
the stresses of the adversarial legal system tended to deconstruct ap-
parently secure scientific knowledge. The well-publicized problems
of expert testimony damaged the popular image of science and
medicine, a fact that warrants a reconsideration of received historio-
graphical truths concerning the public embrace of scientific and
medical expertise at the turn of the twentieth century.
THE POWER OF POISON
In 1893 the New York toxicologist R. Ogden Doremus observed,
in the opinion journal The Forum, that "we seem to be passing
RESPONSIBILITY IN VICTORIAN TRIALS (1981); Janet Ann Tighe, 'Be It Ever So Little"
Reforming the Insanity Defense in the Progressive Era, 57 BULL. HIST. MED. 397 (1983); Janet
Ann Tighe, The Legal Art of Psychiatric Diagnosis: Searching for Reliability, in FRAMING
DISEASE: STUDIES IN CULTURAL HISTORY (Charles E. Rosenberg & Janet Golden eds.,
1992); Janet Ann Tighe, A Question of Responsibility: The Development of American
Forensic Psychiatry, 1838-1930 (1983) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania). The
notable exception is JAMES MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1993) (examining toxicology and poison cases).
8. See, e.g., Alphonso T. Clearwater, Medical Expert Testimony, 189 N. AM. REV. 821
(1909); A.W. Henckell, The Value of Expert Testimony in Medico-Legal Cases from a Medical
Standpoint, 67 N.Y. MED. J. 101 (1898); John Sterling, The MedicalExpert Witness, 22 JAMA
377 (1894); Henry Smith Williams, Medical Experts and Homicide, 164 N. AM. REV. 160
(1897). For the more important American poisoning trials in the first two-thirds of the century,
see MOHR, supra note 7. For British cases, see Michael Harris, Social Diseases? Cnme and
Medicine in the Victorian Press, in MEDICAL JOURNALS AND MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE:
HISTORICAL ESSAYS (W.F. Bynum, Stephen Lock & Roy Porter eds., 1992); Tal Golan,
Scientific Expert Testimony in Anglo-American Courts, 1782-1923 (1997) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Berkeley).
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through an epidemic of poisoning."9 What Doremus could not have
known in 1893 was that New York's poisoning epidemic had only
just begun. Between 1860 and 1891, there were only two trials for
murder by poison in Manhattan."° In the next ten years there were at
least six more trials. Several involved notable citizens, and all com-
manded the attention of the city and, in some cases, the country."
These six cases were part of a larger phenomenon. There were many
other prominent trials elsewhere in the United States and in Europe,
not to mention countless accusations and investigations that never
made it to trial. 2 Under the headline Poison Epidemic Sweeps the
Land, the New York World in 1899 reported on confirmed or sus-
pected poisoning cases in Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illi-
nois, Kansas, and Maryland. 3
The 1890s poisoning "epidemic" served as a fitting climax to a cen-
tury obsessed with poison murder. Available statistics suggest that
poison murder might not have deserved so much attention, because
it accounted for a tiny fraction of the total number of murder cases."
In his recent historical survey of murder in the United States, Roger
Lane claims that "poison has.., always remained out of style every-
where but in the pages of mystery novels."'" But statistics do not tell
9. R. Ogden Doremus, Can ChemicalAnalysis Convict Poisoners?, 16 FORUM 229 (1893).
10. In 1873 Frederick Heggi was acquitted in his second trial for murdering his wife. In
1888 Wilhemina Lebkuchner was acquitted by reason of insanity in the poisoning deaths of her
three children. See Rudolph A. Witthaus, Some Toxicological Points in a Case of Homicide by
Morphine, 2 RESEARCHES LOOMIS LAB. 1-14 (1892); Tracy C. Becker, R.A. Witthaus &
Maurice January Lewi, Arguments Before the [New York State] Assembly Committee on
Codes .... In regard to Embalming Dead Bodies (April 23, 1890) (transcript on file in the
Pamphlet Collection, New York Academy of Medicine).
11. The wide interest is reflected in the District Attorney Scrapbooks (on file with the
Municipal Archives of the City of New York) [hereinafter D.A. Scrapbooks], which contain
clippings from newspapers across the country. The overall murder rate for New York City was
slightly lower in the 1890s than in the previous and succeeding decades. See ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF NEW YORK CITY 297-99 (Kenneth T. Jackson ed., 1995).
12. Three separate suspected poisoning cases in New York were reported in just one
month: N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 5, 1983; N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 16, 1893; and N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 22,
1893. For other cases, see N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 18, 1895; N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 19, 1895; N.Y.
WORLD, May 28, 1896; N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1895. There were even a couple of dog poisoners
on the loose: N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 16, 1895; N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 23, 1895. For cases elsewhere,
see ALICE RAVEN, PREJUDICIAL ASSUMPTIONS IN POISON CASES (1937); EDWARD H. SMITH,
FAMOUS POISON MYSTERIES (1927); N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1886; N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1888.
13. N.Y. WORLD, Jan. 15, 1899. A bit of alarmism is evident in this article. Some of the
cases-like those of the people who got sick after eating canned tongue-probably resulted
from bacterial food poisoning or other accidental poisoning.
14. See R.A. WITTHAUS, MANUAL OF TOXICOLOGY 413 (1911); Charles T. Jackson, M.D.,
Statistics of Poisoning in New England, 63 BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 389 (1860). Statistics
for England are more complete. At the central criminal court in London, there were eighty-
three poisoning trials between 1739 and 1878. THOMAS ROGERS FORBES, SURGEONS AT THE
BAILEY: ENGLISH FORENSIC MEDICINE TO 1878, at 127-30 (1985).
15. ROGER LANE, MURDER IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 320 (1997). See id. at 202.
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the whole story. However rare, poison murder was very much in
style in nineteenth-century America. Legal treatises devoted much
attention to the difficulties of prosecuting poison murder cases.
Medical jurisprudence, one of the liveliest areas of American med-
icine at this time, devoted more attention to poisoning than to any
other topic but insanity. Poison also figured significantly in popular
literature. Over a hundred book-length accounts of individual pois-
oning trials were published, and newspapers covered poison murders
with particular interest. Writers of sensation novels, detective stories,
and other popular fiction frequently turned to poisoning as a plot
device. 6
Why did a relatively rare crime attract so much interest and fear?
Nineteenth-century Americans suspected that many cases of poison-
ing escaped detection altogether. "We do not know how many
persons who were buried as having died of disease, may have died of
poison," one physician explained." Every poison murder case that
made it to trial raised the fear that scores more had gone undetected.
This fear of undiscovered crime lay at the heart of the nineteenth-
century obsession with poison murder. Poisoning involved a double
secrecy. It was carried out secretly, within the home, behind closed
doors, and usually by a person on intimate terms with the victim.
This quality, though, was shared with other sorts of murder-one
could, after all, bludgeon and shoot and stab in private. But there
was another aspect to the secretness of poison: unlike other
weapons, poison did its work on the interior of the body, leaving no
visible signs of violence. Because the symptoms of some poisons
resembled those of disease, it was often difficult to tell whether a
person had died from poison or from natural causes. Most forms of
murder were easy to identify, one author explained, "while poison
would only leave a doubt as to the true nature of death."18 It was this
uncertainty that made poisoning such a dreaded crime.
To dispel these fears, what was needed was an effective way to
detect and deter poisoning crimes. For centuries this had been an
almost impossible task, but in the nineteenth century the situation
changed. By the 1840s, toxicology had emerged as the first modern
forensic science. Aided by advances in chemistry and medical diag-
nosis, physicians and scientists learned to distinguish the symptoms
of poisoning from those of disease. By the middle of the century,
16. Mark Essig, Science and Sensation: Poison Murder and Forensic Medicine in
Nineteenth-Century America 4-7 (2000) (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with
author).
17. Jackson, supra note 14, at 389.
18. Charles Greene Cumston, The Medico-Legal Aspect and Criminal Procedure in the
Poison Cases of the XVI Century, 23 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 173 (1905-06).
Essig
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scientists could isolate the tiniest traces of some poisons from the
corpses of murder victims and produce them for all to see in court.
The most reliable tests were those for the metallic poison arsenic,
which also happened to be the poison most frequently used for
murder. These tests offered hope that the terrible doubt surrounding
poisoning crimes might be replaced with greater certainty.
But these technical accomplishments by themselves were not
enough. Physicians and toxicologists also needed to deploy their
knowledge within the troublesome context of criminal trials, which
often turned into battles between rival experts. Such battles
provoked calls from the medical profession for reforms in the legal
system's method of taking expert testimony.
REFORMING EXPERT TESTIMONY
Physicians, midwives, sea captains, and others had served as
experts in the English courtroom since the medieval era, providing
instruction in cases where the facts in dispute were such that the
judge and jury did not have the knowledge necessary to render a
decision. But the expert's specific role in the courtroom has changed
over time. Before the eighteenth century, judges and juries took an
active role in the gathering and presentation of evidence. In this
traditional system, experts appeared either as part of the jury or as
official advisors to the court. During the eighteenth century, the legal
system underwent what is known as the "adversarial revolution," in
which judge and jury assumed passive, neutral positions and litigants
gained control over the production of evidence. After this revolution
(and continuing down to the present), experts appeared most fre-
quently not as jurors or court advisors but as partisan witnesses. As
science and technology began to permeate every aspect of social life
in the nineteenth century, there was a constantly increasing demand
for scientific and technical knowledge in the courtroom, and experts
appeared in every sort of legal proceeding, from insurance litigation
to patent disputes to criminal trials.19
Scientists who appeared as witnesses quickly learned that the
transfer of knowledge from the laboratory to the courtroom was
fraught with difficulties. The adversarial structure of legal proceed-
ings assured that all expert testimony would be contradicted, and the
experts worried that battles of expert testimony damaged the image
of their professions. Tal Golan has shown that throughout the Vic-
torian era, "[t]he constant spectacle of eminent doctors, chemists,
geologists, engineers, and other men of science contradicting each
19. See Golan, supra note 8, at chs. 1-2.
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other on the witness stand.., cast serious doubts on their integrity
and on their science in the eyes of the public."'2 In his study of medi-
cal jurisprudence in the nineteenth-century United States, James
Mohr has argued that in the latter half of the century, "the process of
eliciting medical evidence continued to make physicians look scien-
tifically weak, internally divided, and dangerously unprofessional."2'
Given these difficulties, physicians, scientists, and lawyers devoted
considerable attention to reforming the American system of taking
expert testimony. By one estimate, in the year 1898 alone there were
238 articles on expert testimony published in U.S. medical journals.2
The articles reveal a great deal about contemporary conceptions of
medicine, science, and expertise.
At the very beginning of his long and distinguished career,
Learned Hand published an important article that captured the
central dilemma of expert testimony.23 The system allowed experts
for the opposing sides to provide contradictory testimony and then
commanded "the jury to decide, where doctors disagree." But, Hand
observed, "It is just because they are incompetent for such a task
that the expert is necessary at all."'24 Most writers on the topic of
expert testimony agreed with Hand's diagnosis of the problem.
Prescribing a remedy proved a more contentious issue.
Only a hardy few defended the current adversarial system. Some
claimed that the American system, while imperfect, was the best
available. At the International Congress of Forensic Medicine, held
in Paris in 1889, French scientists expressed dissatisfaction with the
French system of neutral expert commissions, because they believed
it weighed unfairly against the accused. When proposals for other
systems were put to a vote, the most popular proved to be an adver-
sarial system much like that in the U.S. "In view of the conflicting
testimony from countries in which the commission plan has been
thoroughly tried," a Medical Record editorialist concluded, "we cer-
tainly ought to approach any contemplated change in our methods
with great care."25
20. Id. at 150.
21. MOHR, supra note 7, at 198.
22. 34 JAMA 655 (1900).
23. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
21 ALBANY MED. ANNALS 599 (1900). The article was so well received that it was reprinted at
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901) [hereinafter Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations].
According to Hand's most recent biographer, this early article "shows the distinctive voice of
the mature Hand for the first time." GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND
THE JUDGE 60 (1994).
24. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations, supra note 23, at 54.
25. How Expert Testimony Could Be Made More Valuable, 48 MED. REc. 915 (1895). For
Essig
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Most commentators, however, continued to push for change. Ac-
cording to one line of thought, the problem could be laid at the feet
of incompetent or corrupt experts. Some argued that the medical
profession itself should establish the standards of expertise, by
having county or state medical societies certify certain physicians as
experts.26 Others suggested that it was the legal system that needed
to perform this task. In this view, courts did not sufficiently exercise
a function that today is called "gatekeeping": deciding who qualifies
as an expert. As one critic of the system put it, courts "should at least
make the effort to discriminate between the real and the pseudo-
expert." 7 The editors of the Journal of the American Medical Assoc-
iation (JAMA) published many editorials stressing the importance of
gatekeeping by the courts," and they were echoed in the pages of the
influential North American Review. Were judges to exclude incom-
petent experts, a writer for the latter journal claimed, the courts "will
be rid of corrupt and worthless so-called experts."29
In fact, there were only a few trials in which the problems of expert
testimony could be blamed on incompetent or corrupt experts. One
of the most infamous instances occurred during the 1896 poison
murder trial of Mary Fleming in New York. Fleming's lawyers did
not dispute that there was arsenic in the body of the deceased, but
they did deny that Fleming put it there. The defense claimed that
Walter Scheele, a German chemist who was serving as an expert for
the prosecution, introduced arsenic into the body after death in
order to secure a conviction and enhance his reputation. Defense
lawyers produced a number of witnesses who claimed to have heard
Scheele admit, "'My reputation rests on this case. I have fixed mat-
ters so that she will be found guilty whether she is guilty or not.
'3°
The charges against Scheele, true or not, sufficed to produce reason-
able doubt, and Fleming was acquitted.3 (They also were enough to
ruin Scheele's reputation and his career as an expert witness. The
another editorial supporting the current system, see Sterling, supra note 8.
26. Henry Wollman, Physicians-Expert Witnesses, 32 JAMA 571 (1899); see also Carlos
F. MacDonald, Expert Evidence in Ciminal Trials, 1 PROC. ACAD. POL. SC. 641 (1911). One
writer proposed establishing a civil service board that would administer examinations and
qualify experts in certain fields. Williams, supra note 8.
27. Williams, supra note 8, at 161.
28. E.g., 40 JAMA 1149 (1903); Medical Juries, 41 JAMA 500 (1903); Expert Witnesses
Appointed by the Court, 42 JAMA 960 (1904).
29. Clearwater, supra note 8, at 826.
30. N.Y. HERALD, June 6, 1896 (on file in DA. Scrapbooks, supra note 11); see also N.Y.
WORLD, June 6, 1896; N.Y. WORLD, June 17, 1896. Scheele had testified more successfully in
the Buchanan trial, which is discussed below.
31. After the trial, jurors claimed that the testimony against Scheele had been central to
their verdict. N.Y. PRESS, June 26, 1896 (on file in D.A. Scrapbooks, supra note 11).
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next time he appeared in the newspapers was during the Great War,
when he was arrested for participating in a German plot to blow up a
U.S. munitions ship in a New Jersey port.32)
These sorts of problems were extremely rare. The most celebrated
cases involving conflicting expert testimony-including the Buchan-
an trial discussed below, and several other poisoning trials around
the turn of the century- featured not marginal experts but the most
respected scientists and physicians of the day. Critics who focused on
excluding the corrupt and incompetent missed the point: when even
the elite disagreed with each other in court, it was clear that the
source of the problem lay elsewhere.
Many commentators argued that experts disagreed because they
were paid to disagree by the opposing sides in the case. One attempt
to sidestep this problem was the "Leeds method," named after the
English city where it was used. In this system, the medical experts
from both sides meet in conference before the trial and exchange
views on the issues involved. As a result, according to one prominent
textbook of legal medicine, "at Leeds the medical witnesses are
hardly ever cross-examined at all," the standards of testimony are
raised, and the judge and jury have more faith in the testimony.33 The
Leeds method was an attempt to meliorate the mercenary aspects of
expert witnessing. The courtroom, it was thought, was too steeped in
an adversarial culture. The Leeds method would create a private
space that could foster collegial discussion and, if not agreement,
than at least more congenial disagreement.
The Leeds system, however, still preserved the role of the partisan
expert that many saw as the root of the problem. Exasperated by the
parade of contradictory experts in one trial, one JAMA editorialist
offered the tongue-in-cheek suggestion that partisan experts, rather
than actually testifying, should simply be "stood up in line and can-
celed in pairs so that by a sort of reductio ad absurdum it might be
seen by the remainder which side to credit."' This writer and many
others sought alternative ways of dispensing credit in the courtroom.
By far the most common proposals involved "neutral," court-
appointed experts. Such proposals came in a number of varieties. In
the most moderate ones, defendants retained their right to call their
own experts, and cross-examination was preserved. Learned Hand
provided one of the more persuasive arguments for this position,
32. For his obituary, see N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1922.
33. Lawrence Godkin, Introduction to A SYSTEM OF LEGAL MEDICINE 23 (Allan McLane
Hamilton & Lawrence Godkin eds., E.B. Treat 2d ed. 1900) (1894). A similar proposal can be
found in Landon Carter Gray, New Method of Taking Expert Testimony, 57 N.Y. MED. J. 547
(1893).
34. Editorial, The Medical Expert, 48 JAMA 1355 (1907).
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proposing "a board of experts or a single expert, not called by either
side, who shall advise the jury of the general propositions applicable
to the case." Hand's plan allowed that both sides "might call all the
experts that money could procure," and that the "right of cross-
examination could be exercised without limitation." Trials would
proceed much as they currently did, but "the difference would be
that the final statement of what was true would be from the assisting
tribunal." The jury had every right to ignore the evidence of the
official experts, but it probably wouldn't: "how great is the effect
upon the jury, confused by the arguments of the two contestants, of
some really impartial expression of an opinion upon which they can
rely.
A number of states attempted to enact proposals closely resem-
bling Hand's. Two were successful. In Michigan, Public Act 175 for
the year 1905 stipulated that expert witnesses should receive fees no
larger than ordinary witness fees (unless the court approved a higher
fee); each side could call no more than three expert witnesses, except
in homicide cases (unless the court approved more); in homicide
cases, the court was to appoint from one to three "suitable disin-
terested persons" to serve as official experts, their fees fixed by the
court and paid by the county; and both sides retained the right to call
their own experts.36 Rhode Island passed a similar law.37 Attempts by
other states to pass this sort of legislation failed. New York State put
a great deal of effort into such measures but had little to show for it.
In 1904 the president of the state medical society complained that a
joint committee of the state medical and bar associations had been
appointed, "but after dragging on for two or three years the commit-
tee reported its inability to accomplish anything."38 The committee
nonetheless dragged on for at least another ten years. In 1909 it pro-
posed a measure similar to the Michigan and Rhode Island statutes,
but the bill went nowhere.39 Five years later the committee scaled
back its expectations, wrote a more limited bill dealing only with the
insanity defense, and managed to get it passed in both houses of the
35. Hand, supra note 23, at 56. Similar proposals include A Bill for the Regulation of
Expert Testimony, 19 JAMA 113 (1892); William J. Herdman, The Physician as a Witness in
Court, 34 JAMA 650 (1900); How Expert Testimony Could Be Made More Valuable, supra
note 25; MacDonald, supra note 26; Medical Expert Testimony, 55 JAMA 1813 (1910);
Reform in MedicalExpert Testimony, 25 JAMA 444 (1895); Williams, supra note 8.
36. 1905 Mich. Pub. Acts 175. Michigan's law was later declared unconstitutional. 13 N.Y.
ST. J. MED. 223, 268 (1913).
37. See Lee M. Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J.
248 (1909); 55 JAMA 1912 (1910).
38. Algernon T. Bristow, Address by President, 98th Session of the Medical Society of the
State of New York, 42 JAMA 632, 632 (1904).
39. 10 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 154 (1910).
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state legislature. The governor promptly vetoed ,it. ° The American
Medical Association established its own "Special Committee on
Expert Medical Testimony," which followed a trajectory much like
that of the New York State Committee: after a few years of sweeping
proposals regarding all medical expert testimony, it eventually
concentrated its efforts on the insanity defense alone. 1
Despite the failure of most of these reform attempts, many writers
continued to propose systems involving neutral experts that were
even more radical, in that they eliminated or curtailed the power of
the jury. An 1892 JAMA editorial suggested that an "expert judge"
alone should try cases involving medical questions, because such
cases "should never be given to a jury of non-experts. 4 2 In other
proposals, the jury was retained, but the court-appointed experts
were granted privileged roles. In the aftermath of a 1901 poisoning
trial, one writer proposed that an official board of experts should
hear the expert evidence from defense and prosecution without the
jury present, make its decision, and then present that decision to the
jury "as a ruling, parallel to that of a judge on a point of law."43 A
number of other proposals varied slightly, but agreed that court-
appointed experts should be exempted from cross-examination and
granted judicial or quasi-judicial powers." Frequently such articles
approvingly noted the French or German systems of expert testi-
mony, which were non-adversarial and not subject to lay review. 5
In all of these various proposals, the common element was that the
physicians objected to operating within a system that was not under
their control. Part of the anger was directed at the legal profession.
An American Medical Association report argued that "modern
economic and social development offers logical leadership to medi-
cine," and regretted that "other and less natural dictatorship". still
prevailed.46 An 1892 JAMA editorial criticized a system featuring
"medical experts who are hired like horses to drive so far, and in
40. 14 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 267 (1914). On the New York state efforts, see also 67 N.Y. ST. J.
MED. 192 (1898); 9 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 134 (1909); 11 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 232-33 (1911); 12 N.Y. ST.
J. MED. 258 (1912); 13 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 223 (1913); 52 JAMA 1054 (1909).
41. 4 AM. MED. ASS'N BULL. 167-68, 191 (1909); 5 AM. MED. Ass'N BULL. 112-13, 117-18,
406-08 (1909-10); 8 AM. MED. ASS'N BULL. 163-66 (1913); Tighe, 'Be It Ever So Little, 'supra
note 7.
42. Expert Medical Testimony in Jury Trials, 18 JAMA 304 (1892).
43. Kenneth W. Millican, The Patrick Case and Its Lessons, 75 N.Y. ST. MED. J. 593 (1902).
44. Gray, supra note 33; How Expert Testimony Could Be Made More Valuable, supra
note 25; 67 N.Y. MED. J. 101 (1898); 78 N.Y. MED. J. 152 (1903).
45. Medical Experts, 22 JAMA 227 (1894); Chicago Medico-Legal Society, 18 JAMA 461
(1892).
46. Report of the Sub-Committee on Hygiene, Medical Jurisprudence and Medical
Economics, 5 AM. MED. ASS'N BULL. 108 (1909).
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such and such directions, with the proper harness and appointments
for one purpose alone." Physicians, the writer thought, were the ones
who should be in the driver's seat, cracking the whip. 7
Most doctors believed that medicine was a science, that science
was the most certain of all forms of knowledge, and that only those
with scientific training could evaluate scientific testimony. While it
was bad enough that physicians were at the mercy of lawyers in the
courtroom, it was simply outrageous that the ultimate decision rested
with the jury. One physician complained that "our great questions of
medical science" must be decided by "twelve men taken from the
body of the people, often illiterate, invariably ignorant even of the
elements of science."'  Choosing even harsher words, a JAMA
editorial averred that "the jury find themselves suddenly raised to an
exalted position with no other qualification than that of profound
ignorance of the case in court, coupled with general stupidity on all
other questions."49
LOSING FAITH IN THE JURY
At the end of the nineteenth century, such negative opinions about
the jury system were not unique to members of the medical profes-
sion. The jury had held an exalted position from colonial times
through the early nineteenth century, when it was celebrated as a
check on elite manipulation of governmental and legal power. In
Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton called the jury "the very pal-
ladium of free government," a phrase much favored by subsequent
defenders of the jury system. (Mark Twain was less impressed by the
quotation. "I do not know what a palladium is, having never seen a
palladium," he wrote, "but it is a good thing no doubt at any rate."5 )
According to one historian, faith in the jury was one aspect of "the
prevailing political philosophy of the constitution-framing era: that
popular control over, and participation in, government should be
maximized. "'
47. Expert Medical Testimony in Jury Trials, 18 JAMA 304 (1892); see also A Bill for the
Regulation of Expert Testimony, supra note 35.
48. Gray, supra note 33.
49. Expert Medical Testimony in Jury Trials, supra note 42. For further criticisms of juries,
see ALLAN MCLANE HAMILTON, RECOLLECTIONS OF AN ALIENIST, PERSONAL AND PROFES-
SIONAL 293 (1916); Clark Gapen, Legal Criticism of Expert Evidence, 21 JAMA 447 (1893); 34
JAMA 654 (1900). When confronted with constitutional objections to doing away with the jury
system, another JAMA editorial suggested the simple expedient of changing the constitution:
"Surely our legal machinery is not rooted and fixed so irrevocably in constitutional regulations
and precedents that adoption of some better system than the present .... is wholly out of the
question." Editorial, 46 JAMA 1700 (1906).
50. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 351 (Hartford, Conn., American Publishing Co. 1872).
51. The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 172 (1964);
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Over the course of the century, however, the power and influence
of the jury diminished markedly. 2 By the late nineteenth century,
calls for reform or even abolition of the jury system were not uncom-
mon, and they were usually tied to complaints about the intelligence
of jurors. In Arena, a writer complained that "the average jury is
below the average of the general intelligence and integrity of the
community." He suggested establishing "some simple educational
tests" that would "exclude incompetent or undesirable jurors. '5 3 In
the Nation, E.L. Godkin railed against the practice of excluding
potential jurors simply because they had formed an opinion from
reading newspapers. Excluding those who read newspapers, Godkin
wrote, means excluding the intelligent, so that "the process of
impaneling a New York jury, in a notorious case, is apt to consist in a
search for twelve extremely illiterate or half-witted men."54 Mark
Twain had preached the same sermon to a larger audience many
years earlier. "The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and hon-
esty," he wrote, and embraces "idiots, blacklegs, and people who do
not read newspapers."55 In the Albany Law Journal, a writer com-
plained that "the better qualified classes" evaded jury duty, leaving
only those men from the lower classes, whose "misfortunes and
unpleasant positions in life" render them "constitutionally disconten-
ted and pessimistic" and therefore unfit for jury service. He sugges-
ted that jury verdicts should require only a majority of eight or nine
rather than unanimity. But advocating the outright abolishment of
the jury system, the writer maintained, was simply unreasonable, and
any person who did so was clearly "an imbecile."56
There were quite a few such imbeciles about, and they wrote for
the most respected journals in the country. In the North American
Review, a writer advocated substituting one or more judges for the
jury and suggested that if such a reform were carried out "a less
number of innocent men would be convicted, fewer guilty ones
would escape, packing and manipulating juries would be done away
see also JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOC-
RACY 36-37, 88-90 (1994).
52. The Changing Role of the Jury, supra note 51; see also ABRAMSON, supra note 51, at
17-95; LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 250-52
(1993).
53. F.J. Cabot, Is Trial by Jury, in Criminal Cases, a Failure?, 33 ARENA 512 (1905).
54. E.L. Godkin, Our Jury System, 60 NATION 357 (1895).
55. TWAIN, supra note 50, at 343.
56. S. Stewart Whitehouse, Trial By Jury, As It Is and As It Should Be, 31 ALB. L.J. 504,
506, 504 (1885). For other arguments in favor of preserving the jury system in some form, see
Oliver P. Shiras, The Jury System, 1 YALE L.J. 45 (1891); The Jury System, 5 L. NOTES 4
(1901); Should Trials by Jury be Abolished? 66 ALB. L.J. 307 (1904); Trial by Jury Must be
Preserved, 69 ALB. L.J. 134 (1907).
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with, crime would decrease, ... pettifoggers, jury manipulators, and
shysters would disappear from the courts."57 Another writer in the
same journal also proposed replacing juries with a panel of judges.
Deciding the legal issues that arose within "an advancing civiliza-
tion" required "more than the training acquired by a man on the
farm, in the coal mine, the store, or the workshop," the author ar-
gued. He added, "You might as well call twelve men to the bedside
of a sick man" and allow them to diagnose and prescribe. The
reference to medicine was not idle. The legal system, some thought,
should follow the currents of the time and replace lay knowledge
with specialized.
New York State adopted a milder reform in 1896 when it passed
the Special Jury Law. The law was intended to speed the selection of
juries, primarily in two sorts of cases: those that had received a great
deal of newspaper publicity, and those that involved complex issues
of circumstantial evidence. 9 The law allowed for the pre-selection of
a pool of jurors who were "intelligent" enough to accept circumstan-
tial evidence and "to lay aside opinions or impressions formed from
newspaper reading or hearsay." A special jury commissioner would
select, from the regular jury lists, an elite group of jurors possessed
of certain qualities: they were to be "of good character; of approved
integrity; intelligent; of sound judgment; able to read and write the
English language understandingly; and well informed."' From this
list, a jury could be secured quickly in even the most complicated or
notorious cases.
Justice George C. Barrett of the state supreme court, who drafted
the law, called it "an endeavor to retain the jury system in all its
purity and efficiency, simply by adapting its execution to our modern
environment," and he pointed out that it was not a struck jury or a
blue-ribbon panel because all of the special jurors were chosen from
the regular lists.61 But it was clear that the law involved a change
more radical than Barrett was admitting.62 In an editorial supporting
the proposed law, the New York Times lamented:
57. Edward E. Thomas, TialByJury, 134 N. AM. REv. 247, 257-58 (1882).
58. Charles A. Thatcher, The Failure of the Jury System, 153 N. AM. REv. 247 (1891).
Another argument in favor of abolishing juries can be found in George H. Williams, Abolition
of the Jury System, 9 L. NOTES 150 (1905).
59. Capital murder cases were also mentioned in the law, since many potential jurors were
excused because of their opposition to the death penalty. See Laws of the State of New York,
1896, Ch. 378, pp. 354-62. On the problem of circumstantial evidence, see Essig, supra note 16,
at ch. 2.
60. Laws of the State of New York, supra note 59, at 357.
61. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1896.
62. On the radicalism of the law, see N.Y. RECORDER, June 30, 1896 (on file in D.A.
Scrapbooks, supra note 11).
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the jury system thus far seemed almost impossible to reform....
In spite of its failure to meet the requirements of the complex
conditions of modern society, it has been retained, with little
variation, from the time when it was a bulwark against oppres-
sion by a ruling class. It is long since it was needed to serve that
purpose.'
On the contrary, the Special Jury Law seemed designed precisely to
enforce the privileges of a ruling class. When periodicals reported
that special jurors would be selected "primarily for intelligence '
and would comprise a "special intellectual panel,"65 it was clear to
which class the intelligent belonged. The law itself-requiring "char-
acter," "integrity," "intelligen[ce]," and English literacy-was laced
with code words for class, while some newspaper reports of the law
dispensed even with the codes. According to the New York Times,
the new law would "winnow out the chaff that now blocks the wheels
of the courts in important trials" and thereby avoid "the demoral-
izing spectacle of sifting a rabble in the courtroom."' The prevalence
of such views gave credence to those who feared that the Special
Jury Law tipped the scales of justice in favor of the prosecution. One
defense lawyer referred to the special jury pool as "the standing
army of the gibbet."67
The Special Jury Law provided for the selection of elite panels
because, it was thought, the average citizen was not intelligent
enough to handle complicated cases. This doubt in the abilities of the
public-the flip side of the growing trust in experts-was charac-
teristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But as
experts began to distrust the public, the public returned the favor.'
63. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1896.
64. 4 AM. LAW. 198 (1896).
65. N.Y. PRESS, Nov. 14, 1899 (on file in D.A. Scrapbooks, supra note 11).
66. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 61. The New York Court of Appeals declared the Special Jury
Law constitutional early in 1899. See 52 NE. REP. 572-76 (1899); N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1899 (on
file in D.A. Scrapbooks, supra note 11). One of the earliest trials to feature a special jury was
that of Albert T. Patrick, accused of the 1901 poison murder of millionaire William Marsh
Rice. The use of the special jury in this trial and in a few others apparently aroused little
controversy, and the law attracted very little attention from the national legal press. For other
early trials involving the special jury, see N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1899; N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 20,
1899; N.Y. WORLD, Dec. 2, 1899. The constitutionality of the special jury law was upheld by
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1945. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); see ABRAMSON, supra
note 51, at 116-17.
67. ARTHUR TRAIN, THE PRISONER AT THE BAR: SIDELIGHTS ON THE ADMINISTRATION
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at ix (1906).
68. Like many historians, I use newspaper coverage as a rough gauge of public opinion.
Although this practice is problematic-because different newspapers had different publics,
because readers can not be counted on to agree with what they read, because some members
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Problems of expert testimony in criminal trials revealed to a wide
audience that experts might not be as infallible as they claimed to be.
In an article on the Special Jury Law, the New York Times cited four
cases that were thought to demonstrate the need for the law. Two of
them were poisoning cases from 1890s Manhattan, those of Carlyle
Harris and Robert Buchanan.69 Upon closer inspection, however, the
Times's judgment on this issue appears open to question. As the
following examination of Buchanan's trial indicates, the problems
seemed to lie not with the jurors but with the experts.
THE TRIAL OF ROBERT BUCHANAN
Robert Buchanan was born in the early 1860s in Halifax, Nova
Scotia. He worked at a drug store there for a time, then moved to
Chicago, where he attended the College of Physicians and Surgeons.
After graduating he returned to Nova Scotia, where he married his
first wife, Annie Brice Patterson, in 1885. The couple soon left for
Edinburgh, where Buchanan continued his medical studies. About
two years later they moved to New York City, where Buchanan
began to practice medicine. The Buchanans divorced in November
of 1890. Earlier that year, Dr. Buchanan had made the acquaintance
of Mrs. Anna B. Sutherland. Mrs. Sutherland, who was about twenty
years older than Buchanan, operated a brothel in Newark and was
said to possess a considerable fortune. On November 29, 1890, Buch-
anan and Sutherland were married. Before the wedding, Sutherland
drew up a will leaving all of her possessions to her new husband.
After the wedding, Sutherland closed up shop, and the newlyweds
moved to a house on West 11th Street in Manhattan. °
On the morning of April 23, 1892, Mrs. Buchanan became ill. A
physician who saw her in the afternoon prescribed a medicine
containing chloral to control her "hysterics." A nurse witnessed Dr.
Buchanan administering two teaspoons of this medicine to his wife.
Shortly thereafter she lapsed into a coma. Another physician was
called. The two physicians agreed that Mrs. Buchanan's symptoms
could be caused by either narcotic poisoning, kidney disease, or cer-
ebral hemorrhage. After Buchanan volunteered the information that
his wife's father had died from cerebral hemorrhage, the physicians
decided that this was the likely cause of Mrs. Buchanan's coma as
69. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 61.
70. The information in this and the following paragraphs is taken primarily from the
attorneys' opening and closing statements and from trial testimony: Trial Transcript, State v.
Buchanan, 145 N.Y. 1 (N.Y. 1895). I have also relied on newspaper accounts of the case,
especially N.Y. WORLD, Mar. 20, 28, Apr. 20, 1893, and July 2, 1895; N.Y. TIIES, Mar. 28,
1893.
16
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol14/iss1/4
2002] Essig 193
well, and they prescribed accordingly. She died that night, and
physicians filled out a death certificate listing the cause of death as
cerebral hemorrhage.
The case might have ended there. But within a few weeks of Mrs.
Buchanan's funeral, Dr. Buchanan traveled to Nova Scotia, remar-
ried his first wife, and returned with her to New York. This quick
remarriage seemed to confirm the suspicions of some of the Buch-
anans' acquaintances, who filed affidavits with the district attorney
suggesting that Buchanan may have poisoned his wife. On the basis
of those affidavits, Buchanan was arrested, and the body of his wife
was exhumed for autopsy and toxicological analysis.7 Nine months
later Buchanan stood trial for first degree murder.
The prosecution's case relied primarily on two types of evidence:
the expert testimony of pathologists and toxicologists, and the
testimony of people who had spoken with Buchanan shortly before
and after the death of his wife. The portrait of Dr. Buchanan that
emerged from the latter group of witnesses was not flattering: He
admitted marrying his second wife only for her money; immediately
after the marriage he "began running around with fresher and youn-
ger women;"" he kept the marriage secret from most of his acquain-
tances, referring to his wife as his "housekeeper;"73 he told a friend
that his wife's "face was enough to drive a man to drink."7 When
Buchanan was in Nova Scotia, soon after his wife's death and just
days before his remarriage to his first wife, he wrote to a male friend
the following letter, which contains both damning character evidence
and splendid 1890s sexual slang:
But 0, mamma! there are, I am told, some fine country girls
here, so I feel a wonted necessity to put Barney Fagan in the
mail bag. My conscience tells me it will be a sin if I do not do
something for the good of Nova Scotia. I am told there are to be
a party in the village to-night, and an invitation is extended to
me. Among the party there are [sic] a very pretty blonde lady,
who has seen my photograph, and has got a mash on me. If such
be the case, I must certainly introduce Barney Fagan to her. I
think it would be an outrage if I did not. The grass is nice and
dry, and the warm day sun will have the effect of warming the
ground, thus saving the young lady's skirts and my light over-
coat.... A young fellow told me on the train coming from New
York that my gay diamond will give me all the tail, and more
71. For accounts of these events, see issues of N.Y. WORLD of June 1-3 and 7-10, 1892.
72. N.Y. WORLD, Mar. 28, 1893.
73. Id.
74. N.Y. WORLD, Mar. 29, 1893.
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too, than [sic] I want. But I must promise to marry them all.
That, of course, I will do. I shall marry as many as I can upon
the European plan. I trust Gertie is a good girl. Kindly kiss her
for me.7"
Gertie was Buchanan's daughter from his first marriage.76
During the trial, an English drinking companion of Buchanan's
reported that Buchanan had claimed, in reference to Mrs. Buchanan,
that he would "'dump the old 'ag ....' I says to 'im, 'Doc,' says I,
'you've been a-drinkin' 'ard, old man,' and 'e says, says 'e, 'I'll dump
the old 'ag, George,' 'e says. 77 "Dump" could mean simply "aban-
don" or "divorce," but some of Buchanan's statements implied that
he intended a murderous variety of dumping. Buchanan had, accord-
ing to one friend, invoked his medical knowledge, asserting, "It is an
easy matter for a doctor to get rid of anybody he does not want. 7 8
Doctors presumably had access to the materials and knowledge
necessary for secret murder. The symptoms of morphine poisoning-
in particular, deep coma and very slow respiration-were thought to
be very similar to a number of diseases, including uremic poisoning
(caused by kidney disease) and cerebral hemorrhage. One symptom,
however, appeared in cases of morphine poisoning but not in
patients suffering from these other diseases: "pupils contracted to
pin-points." '79
The physicians who treated Mrs. Buchanan testified that one of
her pupils was normal, the other slightly dilated. Since pin-point
pupils were considered an invariable symptom of morphine poison-
ing, the defense claimed that their absence exonerated Buchanan.
The prosecution had a different theory. At the trial, a man named
Macomber reported a conversation he had had with Buchanan
shortly after his wife's death:
"Well," I said to him, "if she died by taking morphine, how is it
that the pupils of her eyes were not contracted?" "Well," he
says, "I will tell you. A little dose of belladonna obviates all
that." I said, "Did she take belladonna?". .. [H]e stated that
belladonna counteracted the effects of morphine upon the
75. Trial Transcript at 22-23, Buchanan.
76. The letter was too scandalous to print in the newspapers. N.Y. MORNING J., Apr. 21,
1893, referred obliquely to the letter and noted that it was "a painfully embarrassing experi-
ence" for the women in courtroom listening to it being read.
77. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1893.
78. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,1893.
79. WrrHrAUS, supra note 14, at 971-72.
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appearance of the eyes; that, as morphine would contract, bella-
donna would dilate the contraction80
The prosecution claimed that Buchanan had given his wife a dose of
both morphine and belladonna (also referred to as atropine or
atropin). The morphine had killed her, and the belladonna had
dilated her pupils, masking the tell-tale symptom of the morphine.
At the time of Mrs. Buchanan's death, Carlyle Harris was on trial in
New York for the morphine murder of his own wife. Harris's victim,
however, had exhibited the tell-tale pin-point pupils, a fact that
helped convict him. Macomber testified that Buchanan had learned
something from Harris's mistake. According to the friend, Buchanan
had exclaimed, "Harris was a damned young fool; he didn't under-
stand his business; if he poisoned his wife he didn't understand how
to do it without leaving any trace behind him."'"
The prosecution needed to discover the traces that Buchanan had
left behind, a task that fell primarily to scientific and medical experts.
More than three of the four weeks of the trial were consumed by
expert testimony, primarily pathological and toxicological. The pros-
ecution's pathological evidence was derived from an examination of
Mrs. Buchanan's brain and internal organs. It was intended to estab-
lish that she had not died from kidney disease, cerebral hemorrhage,
or any other natural cause. The toxicological evidence relied on the
chemical analysis of Mrs. Buchanan's viscera. It was intended to
establish that morphine was present in quantities sufficient to cause
death, and that belladonna was present as well.
The duties of the experts for the defense were simpler. They did
not need to make a positive case for anything; they needed merely to
cast doubt upon the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The de-
fense attacked the prosecution toxicologists by suggesting that their
methods were outmoded and unreliable. They attacked the pros-
ecution pathologists by claiming that their autopsy methods were not
thorough, and as a result that many possible causes of death could
not be ruled out. The defense "suggested that Mrs. Buchanan might
have died of any disease known to medical science," the Times
reported, "except, perhaps, housemaid's knee or a combination of
morphine and atropine poisons. '
In the Buchanan case, as in all cases involving scientific testimony,
expert witnesses were asked to convey complex technical infor-
mation to a lay jury. But it is no easy task to make a jury understand
80. Trial Transcript at 601, Buchanan.
81. Id. at 709; see also Testimony of Augustus W. B. Garrison, Trial Transcript at 773,
Buchanan.
82. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1893.
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in a few days or weeks what a scientist has spent years studying. For
judge and jury, accepting expert testimony meant trusting certain
bearers of scientific knowledge as much as it meant understanding
the science involved. Each side in the trial employed a number of
techniques to enhance its own credibility and to undermine that of
the opposition. My analysis will focus primarily upon one such tech-
nique: the courtroom scientific demonstration. The demonstrations
ostensibly were intended to lend transparency to science, to allow
the members of the jury to "see for themselves" the truth of certain
scientific claims. But exactly who was seeing what became a matter
of contention.
The most obvious markers of credibility were the credentials of the
expert. Often the first question put to an expert on direct examin-
ation asked him to state his education. Take, for example, the
testimony of one of the pathologists for the prosecution: "Prof. T.
Mitchell Prudden, who was then called, stated that he was graduated
from the Yale Medical School in 1873, had continued his studies in
Vienna, Berlin, Heidelberg, and London, and was now Professor of
Pathology in the New York College of Physicians and Surgeons. '
The star witness for the defense, the toxicologist Victor C. Vaughan,
Dean of the Faculty of the University of Michigan Medical School,
possessed an even more impressive list, described effusively by the
New York Times
It took him more than fifteen minutes to tell of all the colleges
from which he was graduated, of all the institutions and famous
laboratories in this country and abroad in which he had studied,
of all the titles he held, and of all the scientific societies in this
country and abroad of which he was a member. It was 'the
Royal Society of' this and 'the National Society of' that, until
the jurors began to gaze in amazement at the modest, middle-
aged man in the witness chair.'
It is important to keep in mind that lawyers, jurors, and reporters
would not always have been impressed by such a list. Forty years
before, at a poisoning case in Albany, New York, an expert's creden-
tials were framed in a markedly different light. An attorney testified
that his expert witness "was not put on the stand because he had a
diploma in his pocket," but because he was "an intelligent, scientific,
and honest man" who had performed a great number of autopsies.
He was, in the lawyer's words, "learned and intelligent in spite of the
83. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1893.
84. Id. For Vaughan's testimony, see Trial Transcript at 1992ff, Buchanan.
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colleges."'85 The difference between that speech and the testimony at
the Buchanan trial is one way of measuring the distance between the
Jacksonian era and the end of the century. At the earlier trial, the
lawyer bowed to the anti-elite bias of the day, apologizing for deg-
rees and emphasizing hands-on experience. An attorney of the 1890s
was free to take a different approach, since the professionally trained
expert was now a figure of respect. As the cultural climate changed,
so did the resources and tactics required for the establishment of
credibility in the courtroom.
The experts from both sides possessed impressive credentials, so
the recitation of a laundry list of degrees was unlikely to decide the
issues at hand. The experts turned to models and demonstrations as
a way of conveying complex scientific theories to the jury. Such
courtroom displays usually had aims other than the scientific edu-
cation of the jury. At one point in the trial, Dr. Prudden was under
cross-examination by Charles Brooke, the lead attorney for the de-
fense. As Prudden attempted to explain his pathological examination
of Mrs. Buchanan's brain, Brooke handed him a brain, asking him to
illustrate his points with reference to the model. Prudden, however,
objected to the quality of the model, and called it "a mere caric-
ature" of a real human brain. "Well, hand us back our caricature,"
Brooke said, a statement that led to "a titter from the experts of the
defense." The reason for the defense's mirth was that the "model"
was actually a real human brain, hardened by a preservative.86
The defense immediately seized on the mistake as a way to
impeach Prudden's credibility. A few days after this episode, defense
attorney William O'Sullivan was examining one of the defense's own
pathologists, Arthur J. Wolff, who illustrated his points using the
same brain that Prudden had called a "caricature." The World
described the scene:
Mr. O'Sullivan gazed impressively at the jury and said: "What
have you in your hand?" "A genuine human brain," said the
witness. "Genuine?"... "Yes, a real human brain-not a wax
model, as your pathologist said it was," retorted Mr. O'Sullivan
[to prosecutor Nicoll]. "And not a caricature," said Mr.
Brooke. 7
The prosecution was not pleased with this mockery of their expert
witness, and a few days later, during its cross-examination of Wolff,
they retaliated:
85. MOHR, supra note 7, at 131.
86. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1893.
87. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 77.
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Mr. Wellman reached down under a table and brought to view a
plate containing a pulpy, reddish mass that caused some of the
jurors and the stenographers who sat near by to turn pale.
Rushing toward the witness, he handed it to him, the witness
involuntarily taking the plate in his hands, and shouted: "Tell
me if you do not think that the brain which you have brought
into this case is a caricature of that brain I have just handed you,
which was taken out of a human head this morning?"
Wolff replied, "They are both brains made by God Almighty." Well-
man, according to the Times, "was triumphantly surveying the jurors,
whose eyes, however, were fixed on the gruesome contents of the
plate in Prof. Wolff's hands."'
About ten years after the Buchanan trial, Wellman published The
Art of Cross-Examination, a book that would become a classic of
legal literature. In a chapter entitled Cross-Examination of Experts,
he offered this advice:
The whole effect of the testimony of an expert witness may
sometimes effectually be destroyed by putting the witness to
some unexpected and offhand test at the trial, as to his experi-
ence, his ability and discrimination as an expert, so that in case
of his failure to meet the test he can be held up to ridicule be-
fore the jury, and thus the laughter at his expense will cause the
jury to forget anything of weight that he has said against you.89
Wellman clearly had learned some lessons from the Buchanan trial,
in which one of his own experts had suffered from the technique he
later recommended. He was troubled not in the least by the element
of trickery involved. There was something undignified, even childish,
about the exchanges concerning the brain. The supposed reason why
the models were introduced in the first place-to illustrate a
scientific point-became obscured by the squabble over who could
recognize a "real" brain. However, the episode of the brain, as well
as Wellman's frank discussion of such tactics, convey in particularly
stark terms what the experts were battling over: credibility in the
eyes of the jury. Laymen, the attorneys reasoned, might not be able
to understand the technical content of the testimony, but they could
understand an expert who couldn't tell a real brain from a model. If
they could impeach the credibility of a witness on a simple point,
then his credibility on the more technical issues would be under-
mined as well.
88. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 82.
89. FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 87-88 (1904).
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Another demonstration attempted to establish a particular version
of the events under dispute. Dr. Buchanan testified that on the night
of Mrs. Buchanan's death, he had given her only two teaspoons of
the medicine, a chloral solution, which her doctors had prescribed.
The prosecution contended that he had dissolved in the medicine the
morphine that had killed her. To advance this narrative, the prosecu-
tion called to the stand a pharmacist, who was to demonstrate that a
lethal dose of morphine could be dissolved in two teaspoons of Mrs.
Buchanan's medicine. The pharmacist first passed around the jury
box a spoon, some morphine, and some medicine like that given to
Mrs. Buchanan. He asked the jurors to taste the medicine, and,
according to the Times, "they did so with the apparent fear that it
might be loaded with some one of the many poisons they have been
hearing so much about lately." The pharmacist then filled a spoon
with the medicine and "slowly poured in the poison. The drug
instantly began to dissolve in the liquid. Then that spoonful was
handed around again among the jurors. '
The pharmacist in part had simply demonstrated a scientific matter
of fact about solubility. But, as the reporter for the World noted, the
display may have had a larger impact: "The clever manoevre [sic] of
the Assistant District Attorney was apparent to the dullest under-
standing. He had adroitly pictured Buchanan standing by the
bedside, and had set every one to wondering if the prisoner that af-
ternoon had done just what the druggist had in those few minutes."'"
The demonstration had a rhetorical impact greater than its scien-
tific content. The prosecution was concerned about the difficulties of
building a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence, with no
eyewitness testimony. The pharmacist's demonstration compensated
for that absence by serving as a sort of dramatic re-creation of the
alleged crime, through which jurors were able to "witness" a witness-
less crime. Defense attorney O'Sullivan derided the pharmacist's
demonstration as "a theatrical display."' He was right on that point,
but he was wrong to imply that the demonstrations of his own
experts were any less theatrical. All of the demonstrations served
purposes that went well beyond the establishment of scientific fact.
The final and most important demonstrations of the trial addres-
sed the issue of whether Mrs. Buchanan died of poisoning or of nat-
ural causes. The prosecution's star witness was Rudolph Witthaus, a
Cornell Medical College professor and prominent toxicologist.93
90. N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 15, 1893.
91. Id.
92. N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 19, 1893.
93. Witthaus was best known for his MANUAL OF TOXICOLOGY, supra note 14, a reprint of
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Witthaus claimed success in the difficult task of detecting morphine,
a vegetable alkaloid, in the organs of Mrs. Buchanan.' A year before
the Buchanan trial, Witthaus had contributed the scientific testimony
that helped convict Carlyle Harris of murder with morphine.95
Witthaus's testimony had come under fire in Harris's trial, but at
Buchanan's he found himself in an even stickier situation.'
Under direct examination, Witthaus described the tests he con-
ducted. First, he "hashed" the organs, then purified and reduced the
hash as much as possible. The remaining substance was put through
six different color reaction tests for morphine. These tests involved
reagents that, when morphine was added to them, turned a charac-
teristic color. All of the tests responded positively for the presence of
morphine. Witthaus then conducted physiological tests upon-in the
New York World's phrase-"five unhappy frogs."' The frog injec-
ted with substances from Mrs. Buchanan's viscera exhibited symp-
toms characteristic of morphine poisoning. From the color reaction
and physiological tests, Witthaus concluded that "unquestionably
there was" morphine present in Mrs. Buchanan's organs.'
The defense's attack on Witthaus's testimony was aimed primarily
at the color reaction tests. They argued that Witthaus was a "pseudo-
expert," and that his methods were "obsolete and discredited."" The
defense called Victor C. Vaughan, who had made his reputation
through his research on ptomaines, compounds produced during the
process of organic decomposition.1" Their relevance to morphine
poisoning cases was this: Morphine in a poison victim could never be
isolated in its pure form; it was always mixed with residue from the
4 R.A. WITrHAUS & T.C. BECKER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, FORENSIC MEDICINE AND
TOXICOLOGY (New York, William Wood 1893-96). For his biography, see his obituary, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 1915, and HOWARD A. KELLY & WALTER L. BURRAGE, AMERICAN MEDI-
CAL BIOGRAPHIES 1251-52 (1920).
94. On vegetable alkaloids, see Essig, supra note 16, at ch. 3.
95. Rudolph A. Witthaus, Some Toxicological Points in a Case of Homicide by Morphine,
i 2 RESEARCHES LOOMIS LABORATORY 1-14 (1892).
96. For Witthaus's testimony, see Trial Transcript at 1488, Buchanan.
97. N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 11, 1893.
98. Trial Transcript at 1513, Buchanan. Witthaus expressed less certainty about the
amount of morphine present. From the intensity of the color reactions he estimated that he
had recovered about one-tenth of a grain of morphine, which, he further estimated, indicated
that Mrs. Buchanan had been given at least four or five grains (a grain is about 65 milligrams).
Witthaus testified that since his tests for atropine were inconclusive, he was not prepared to
swear to its presence in the viscera of Mrs. Buchanan. Id at 1513-1514; N.Y. WORLD, supra
note 97; N.Y. TIMES, supra note 86.
99. N.Y. TIMES, supra note 77.
100. VICTOR C. VAUGHAN & FREDERICK G. NOVY, PTOMAINS, LEUCOMAINS, TOXINS
AND ANTITOXINS: THE CHEMICAL FACTORS IN THE CAUSATION OF DISEASE (Philadelphia,
Lea Brothers 3d ed. 1896). For Vaughan's memoirs, see VICTOR C. VAUGHAN, A DOCTOR'S
MEMORIES (1926). For his testimony, see Trial Transcript at 1992ff, Buchanan.
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body, perhaps including ptomaines. Some scientists claimed that
ptomaines could respond to the morphine tests in precisely the same
way as morphine. In other words, if a substance from the viscera of a
suspected poisoning victim were subjected to the morphine tests, a
positive result might indicate morphine, or it might just indicate the
presence of ptomaines produced by normal processes of decom-
position. Two previous morphine poisoning trials, both in Europe,
had publicized these alleged inadequacies in the morphine tests."'
The headline for the Times article covering Vaughan's testimony
read, "Courtroom Made a Laboratory."1" A table was placed in
front of Vaughan, and bottles of chemicals and chemical apparatus
were placed on the table. Vaughan had two bottles, one containing
ptomaines mixed with morphine, the other containing ptomaines
alone. For the substance in each of those two bottles, Vaughan con-
ducted the six tests that Witthaus had described performing on the
extract from Mrs. Buchanan's viscera. After performing the tests, he
invited the jurors to examine the colors and then told them, "The
fact is that the color responses which I have produced here, and
which Profs. Witthaus and Doremus produced with the residue from
Mrs. Buchanan's body, are not characteristic of morphine, but are
distinctively characteristic of ptomaines." According to newspaper
accounts, he convinced the court that the colors produced in his tests
on ptomaines were the same as those produced by Witthaus's tests
on Mrs. Buchanan's organs."°3
Under cross-examination, however, Vaughan's demonstrations
became much more ambiguous, as this exchange demonstrates:
District Attorney: ... you said, I believe, that the authorities
differed in this first test, the ferric-chloride test, some of them
said it was green and some of them that it was blue, with the
reaction, is that so?
Vaughan: There is simply a difference on the eye, I suppose.
District Attorney: A difference in the way people look at color?
Vaughan: Difference in the eye, I suppose...."
101. See WrrrHAUS, supra note 14, at 999. For a popular account of this issue, see JURGEN
THORWALD, THE CENTURY OF THE DETECTIVE 330 (Richard Winston & Clara Winston
trans., Harcourt, Brace & World 1965).
102. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1893.
103. Id.
104. Trial Transcript at 2035, Buchanan.
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After admitting that the authorities disagreed on their evaluations of
color, Vaughan disagreed with the District Attorney about the color
of one of the tests in the courtroom:
District Attorney: Your ptomaines give a yellow, don't [they]?
Vaughan: It gives a purple color, a violet color.
District Attorney: My eyes must be rather bad, I must be
becoming color blind.
Vaughan: Well, it is a violet.... 105
Still later in his cross-examination, Vaughan was asked if he thought
Professors Witthaus and Doremus, the prosecution experts, had
falsely evaluated the results of their tests:
District Attorney: Do you believe they were mistaken in the
colors they said they got which came from the residue that they
found?
Vaughan: It is impossible to say that; I may look at it and say it
was a different color; Prof. Witthaus might say it was green and
I would say it was blue.
District Attorney: In this case there was not one pair of eyes but
two; Dr. Witthaus and Dr. Doremus agreed on the color.
Vaughan: Both might say so and I might say it was green."
After Vaughan's testimony, Witthaus took to the stand again, this
time with his own chemistry set. He performed his own demonstra-
tions to support the validity of his tests. This led to more argument
over the way the tests were performed, the cleanliness of the in-
struments, the quality of the reagents, and how to describe the colors
produced."°
105. Id. at 2037.
106. Id. at 2055.
107. The argument continued long after the trial. See VAUGHAN & Novy, supra note 100,
at 284-94. For an article supportive of Vaughan, see M.W. Clift, The Effect of Putrefactive
Bodies on the Chemical Tests for Morphin, 42 JAMA 1074 (1904). Witthaus staked out his
position in WrrrHAUS & BECKER, supra note 93, at 760-68. Even twenty years after the trial,
Witthaus still sounded angry about it. He referred to Clift's article as "mere incompetent hear-
say by one who was not present at the time." WrrrHAUS, supra note 14, at 1001n.1. Thirty-five
years after the trial, Vaughan wrote in his memoir, "To me, and I have no doubt to the other
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Ostensibly, courtroom scientific demonstrations were intended to
help experts communicate complicated science to an audience of
non-experts, by allowing the jury to "see for themselves" the truth of
a particular claim. At work, however, was a form of surrogate seeing,
as the experts attempted to substitute their own professional vision
for the lay vision of the jury. °8 The demonstrations used the appar-
ent immediacy and transparency of visual aids in order to support a
particular version of events. In the color reaction demonstration,
Vaughan at first successfully guided the sight of the jury: he told the
jury what colors they should see, and they saw them. Skillful cross-
examination, however, exposed the ambiguities of seeing for yourself
and the dangers of seeing through the eyes of an expert.
It is hard to gauge just how Vaughan's testimony affected the jury.
It certainly did not help Buchanan: he was convicted, and a couple of
years later he died in the newly invented electric chair. According to
the Times, the verdict "dumbfounded the crowd,"'" and it certainly
dumbfounded the Times, which had enthusiastically supported the
defense throughout the trial." ° The newspaper's editorial insisted,
Buchanan surely could not have been convicted on the expert
testimony, for it certainly did not prove beyond reasonable
doubt that his victim died from the effects of morphine.... The
verdict was evidently based upon the evidence of character,
motive, and circumstances, and not in the least upon the medical
testimony.11'
The one available scrap of evidence about the jury's reasoning tends
to support the Times's conclusion. H.M. Paradise, a juror interview-
ed after the trial, emphasized the testimony of Buchanan's acquain-
tances, who reported his speech and behavior before and after his
wife's death. Paradise did not mention the expert testimony."2 It is
hard to disagree with the Times's judgment that "the expert evidence
of the presence of morphine.., was 'used up' by other evidence
experts, the trial became a most regrettable affair. It made a break in the friendship between
Professor Witthaus and myself, which lasted for some years, but which, I am glad to say, was at
least partially repaired before his death." VAUGHAN, supra note 100, at 307.
108. See Charles Goodwin, Professional Vision, 96 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 606 (1994),
which includes a fascinating discussion of expert testimony in the Rodney King police brutality
trials.
109. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1893.
110. The NY World showed no surprise. Its editorial on the verdict said, "The defense
has been unusually brilliant, capable and determined.... Yet the case has been so clearly
made out that the twelve jurymen have unanimously agreed that guilt has been proved beyond
any reasonable doubt." Editorial, N.Y. WORLD, Apr. 28, 1893.
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equally expert. 1 . The Recorder and the Morning Journal agreed."'
The expert testimony, in other words, simply canceled itself out,
leaving the jury to make its decisions based on other factors.
DOUBTING THE EXPERT
The weeks of expert testimony, the elaborate scientific demonstra-
tions, the bitter cross-examination-all of this, apparently, counted
for nothing. In fact, as far as physicians and scientists were concern-
ed, it counted for worse than nothing, because it publicized an unflat-
tering image of their professions. The Medical News of Philadelphia
claimed that the Buchanan trial "reawakened inquiry as to whether
the methods of securing and presenting expert testimony may not be
improved.""' 5 But, as we have seen, such inquiry had been going on
for decades and hardly needed to be reawakened.
The Buchanan trial exemplified many of the problems that critics
of the jury system and of the methods of taking expert testimony
wished to correct: Elite scientists testified in exchange for lucrative
fees and disagreed with each other publicly and acrimoniously; the
testimony frequently descended into pettiness and absurdity; in
attempting to sway the jury, both sides concentrated as much on
theatrics, lists of credentials, and the demeanor of their experts as on
the substantive scientific issues under debate; the jury grew confused
and bored; and the trial became another occasion for the public
excoriation of expert witnesses.
At the same time, the trial demonstrated why most of the pro-
posed reforms of expert testimony were ill-conceived. If any of the
proposed systems involving court-appointed experts had been in
effect, Rudolph Witthaus, one of the most prominent toxicologists of
the time, likely would have been named as a "neutral" expert. Using
standard procedures outlined in his own and in most other toxi-
cology textbooks, Witthaus discovered morphine in the body of Mrs.
Buchanan. Had Witthaus been able to testify to that fact as a neutral
expert representing the court, then his opinion would have carried a
great deal more weight. But to have given his opinion the
imprimatur of the court would have been a mistake. Victor Vaughan,
representing the defense, raised legitimate reasons for concern about
Witthaus's findings. His testimony was not offered merely to confuse
the jury; rather, it pointed out that the legitimacy of Witthaus's tests
113. Id..
114. N.Y. RECORDER, Apr. 28, 1893 (on file in D.A. Scrapbooks, supra note 11); N.Y.
MORNING J., Apr. 29, 1893 (on file in D.A. Scrapbooks, supra note 11).
115. Expert Testimony, 62 MED. NEWS 467 (1893).
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was a matter of scientific controversy. Under a system of neutral
experts, this controversy might have never come to light.
Some writers-but very few-recognized this aspect of expert
testimony. In the wake of the Buchanan trial, the Medical News of
Philadelphia argued that adversarial expert testimony was not only
good for the defendant but also good for science:
Science is progressive, but scientists are not always equally so,
and it is only by the open conflict of interested experts that the
full light of truth can be thrown on the more obscure topics. The
Buchanan trial, in fact, instead of leading us to doubt the
correctness of the method in vogue, is a demonstration of the
advantages of that method.... For there can be no doubt that
much scientific matter of great value has been made known by
the defence's witnesses, and that a revision of the analytic
processes for the detection of organic poisons is needed."6
But most scientists and doctors believed that "open conflict" was
precisely the problem. Until they had settled their differences and
could present a unified front to the public, they preferred to keep
their conflicts hidden within their own communities.
7
Other writers, however, drew a conclusion from expert testimony
that was even more controversial: a change in expert testimony was
unwise because the state of medical science did not warrant it. A
Medical News editorialist rejected calls for neutral experts as an
"easy solution" that "ignores the real crux. The medical sciences are
not yet exact.." Harold Moyer, a Rush Medical College professor,
argued in JAMA that "medicine is not an exact science." Medical
questions, he claimed, "are to be largely measured by judgment and
experience, and as long as such is the case, perhaps courts and the
general public are justified in looking askance at our claims of
infallibility.'. 9 Such statements cut against the grain of the dominant
rhetoric of the medical profession, which staked its claim to cultural
authority upon the scientific accuracy of medicine. But Moyer was
simply acknowledging that the profession's scientific claims were
exaggerated. Thanks to the publicity surrounding expert testimony
in celebrated trials, the public was becoming aware of this fact.
116. Id. at 467-68. For a different view of the expert testimony in the Buchanan trial, see 43
MED. REC. 498 (1893).
117. See H.M. COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER: REPLICATION AND INDUCTION IN
SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 162-63 (1985); JASONOFF, supra note 5, at 55.
118. Expert Testimony, 60 MED. NEWS 273 (1892).
119. Moyer neglects the fact that even the allegedly "exact" sciences experienced difficul-
ties in the courtroom. Harold N. Moyer, Experts andExpert Testimony, 18 JAMA 494 (1892);
see also How Expert Testimony Could Be Made More Valuable, supra note 25. For a similar
judgment in the popular press, see AUBURN (NY) GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 1892.
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The sensational murder trial was a major institution in turn-of-the-
century America, extensively covered in newspapers and other peri-
odicals. Most of the trials prominently featured medical expert testi-
mony that did no credit to the profession. Physicians and scientists
devoted so much time and energy to the project of reforming expert
testimony because it was considered to be extremely damaging to the
profession. Expert testimony gave the lie to physicians' claims of
scientific accuracy and professional disinterest. An expert, one writer
claimed, was an "intellectual prostitute ready to sell his opinion and
enlist in the services of the side that pays him.""12 Shifting the sexual
metaphor, a writer in the North American Review charged the
expert with "sacrific[ing] his mistress Science at the shrine of Mam-
mon.' ' . In an opinion overturning the verdict in a personal injury
case, a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice claimed that "there is no
theory so preposterous but that men can be procured to support it
under oath from the witness stand by expert evidence."'22 A lower
court judge in Nebraska told the jury that "expert evidence is of the
very lowest order, and is the least satisfactory."'" A law journal
charged medical expert witnesses with "gaudy and unembarrassed
lying,"'24 and another writer referred to the expert witness as "an
unmitigated joke."'25 Expert testimony had suffered from such
sustained invective that at the close of the 1901 poison murder trial
of Albert T. Patrick, the judge felt compelled to mention that expert
testimony is "permitted by the law as legal evidence." He added: "If
it were of no value or use whatever the law would not sanction its
use, because the law never sanctions useless or profitless things."'26
This, surely, was to damn with faint praise, for the judge offered no
guidance as to what was useful or profitable about the testimony.
A writer in JAMA pointed out that expert testimony "is the
subject of everybody's sneer, and the object of everybody's derision.
It has become a newspaper jest. The public has no confidence in
expert testimony. ' He was certainly correct about the newspapers.
The Manhattan district attorney's office preserved, in scrapbooks,
120. Friedman, supra note 37, at 247.
121. Williams, supra note 8, at 160.
122. 34 JAMA 316 (1900).
123. 33 JAMA 1632 (1899).
124. 21 JAMA 447 (1893) (quoting a contemporaneous law journal).
125. Williams, supra note 8, at 160.
126. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENTS, AGAINST ALBERT T.
PATRICK, APPELLANT. CASE ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS OF THE
PEACE IN AND FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK. NEW YORK STATE COURT OF
APPEALS 2681 (1905).
127. Wollman, supra note 26, at 571.
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newspaper clippings concerning the cases with which it was invol-
ved. '28 The scrapbooks reveal that expert testimony was a hot topic in
editorial pages throughout the country. At the close of the 1892
poison murder trial of Carlyle Harris, newspapers from Massachu-
setts to Georgia, from Missouri to Minnesota, published editorials
about the verdict and the expert testimony, and their judgment was
harsh. 29 A Chicago paper claimed that "'Expert Testimony' grows
daily more absurd and iniquitous,' 3 ° while the Utica Observerasked,
"Is expert evidence without value, then? Many sensible people will
answer in the affirmative.
'131
Much of the blame was directed at the legal system's allegedly
outdated system of expert testimony. But the problems of expert
evidence also cast doubt upon the authority of scientific knowledge.
During the expert evidence phase of the Buchanan trial, newspapers
ran headlines such as "Experts, Eh?' 1 32 and "Can Chemistry Lie?'
3
Under the headline "She's a Lying Jade," the Recorder printed this
statement:
Dr. Victor C. Vaughan, the expert from the University of Michi-
gan, proved at the trial of Dr. Robert W. Buchanan yesterday
that chemistry is a lying jade. He proved that she is double-
faced; that no man can swear by her. He proved, positively and
convincingly, that her devotees have been deceived by her; that
chemical experts believing in her have sworn to things she told
them were false. Prof. Vaughan proved, in a word, that expert
chemical testimony, as it has been known, is untrustworthy, and
almost absolutely so when a human life hangs in the balance.'"
When he attacked opposition experts, Vaughan had not intended to
undermine the validity of his own profession. But the newspapers
were drawing their own conclusions from the unedifying spectacle of
expert testimony, and those conclusions challenged the authority of
science.
Historians have outlined ways in which physicians embraced the
ideals of scientific knowledge even before it became useful in clinical
practice, because it served as a useful tool in professional consolida-
tion, discipline building, and the establishment of cultural author-
128. D.A. Scrapbooks, supra note 11.
129. See Delancey Nicoll Scrapbooks, Feb. 1892 (on file at Municipal Archives of the City
of New York) [hereinafter Nicoll Scrapbooks].
130. CHI. EVENING NEWS, Feb. 6, 1892 (on file in Nicoll Scrapbooks, supra note 129).
131. UTICA OBSERVER, Feb. 6, 1892 (on file in Nicoll Scrapbooks, supra note 129).
132. N.Y. MORNING J., Apr. 11, 1893 (on file in D.A. Scrapbooks, supra note 11).
133. N.Y. RECORDER, Apr. 17, 1893 (on file in D.A. Scrapbooks, supra note 11).
134. N.Y. RECORDER, Apr. 19, 1893 (on file in D.A. Scrapbooks, supra note 11).
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ity.135 But historians have not noticed that the scientific ideal could
backfire as well. When performance failed to matched rhetoric, the
public lost faith in scientific and medical expertise.
SCIENCE AND THE PUBLIC
The distinction between "the expert" and "the public" was not the
natural or inevitable result of advances in knowledge. Rather, the
distinction was laboriously constructed and served the interests of
professional groups whose very existence depended upon distin-
guishing their knowledge and practices from those of the general
population.136 Expert testimony became such a troubling issue for the
medical profession because it broke down this distinction: lay jurors
evaluated medical testimony, and conflicting testimony revealed un-
certainties within scientific and medical knowledge, thus undermin-
ing the authority that separated the expert from the public. Proposals
to reform expert testimony were attempts to reconstruct the boun-
dary between the public and expert, by eliminating lay oversight and
adversarial testimony. But the proposals failed, and harsh public
criticism of expert witnesses continued.
At the turn of the twentieth century, physicians and scientists were
beginning to earn a significant degree of cultural authority: more
people began to trust these experts to make decisions for them. Paul
Starr entitles his analysis of this era of American medicine "the
retreat of private judgment." '37 He writes, "The less one could
believe 'one's own eyes'-and the new world of science continually
prompted that feeling-the more receptive one became to seeing the
world through the eyes of those who claimed specialized, technical
knowledge, validated by communities of their peers. ' But the
jurors in the Buchanan trial-and those who read about the trial in
the newspapers-learned that "communities of... peers" disagreed,
that "specialized, technical knowledge" was as prone to error as any
other type, and that they could not trust the eyes of experts even in
apparently so simple a matter as recognizing colors.
Judith Walzer Leavitt, following Starr's lead, has claimed that the
"knowledge gap produced when medicine became increasingly
technical put the uninformed in awe of medical science.... [T]hey
came to accept the benefits of medicine without knowing how they
worked." This ever-growing gap in knowledge helped to produce the
135. See Warner, supra note 3, at 454-55.
136. See Steven Shapin, Science and the Public, in COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF
MODERN SCIENCE 990-1007 (R.C. Olby et al. eds., 1990).
137. STARR, supra note 2, at 127-44.
138. Id. at 19.
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authority of medicine. According to Leavitt, "The distancing of
scientific knowledge and technical expertise from the general
population enhanced its appeal for millions of Americans." '139 Expert
testimony removed this distance between the expert and the general
population, and did not allow private judgment to retreat. The jury
could not simply place its trust in medical authority, because medical
authority was represented by two sides making diametrically op-
posed claims. The jury had to decide which of the experts was more
credible. If Leavitt is correct in suggesting that the appeal of medi-
cine rested upon its distance from the public, then expert testimony,
by removing the distance, also removed the appeal. The more closely
the public viewed technically advanced science and medicine, the
less awe it inspired, and the more it came to resemble any other
fallible human practice.
Trials involving forensic science were an important and under-
recognized force in shaping the public face of scientific and medical
expertise at the turn of the century. Fifty years earlier, physicians
had entertained the hope that forensic science would enhance the
reputation of their profession. In 1851 Theodric Beck, the great
American scholar of medical jurisprudence, expressed high hopes for
forensic toxicology:
It is such duties ably performed, that raise our profession to an
exalted rank in the eyes of the world; that cause the vulgar, who
are ever ready to exclaim against the inutility of medicine, to
marvel at the mysterious power by which an atom of arsenic,
mingled amidst a mass of confused ingesta, can still be
detected.1"
By the end of the century, it was clear that forensic science more
often had precisely the opposite effect, providing "the vulgar" with
more evidence of the "inutility of medicine."
In 1904 the President of the Medical Society of the State of New
York pointed out that "the public judges any class of men according
to their appearance in public; and... the people continue to judge us
139. JUDITH WALZER LEAVrrr, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILDBEARING IN AMERICA, 1750-
1950, at 174 (1986). The same process seems to hold for more recent science. According to
Harry Collins:
Recent studies of science have shown that there is a relationship between the extent to
which science is seen as a producer of certainty and distance from the research front. The
relationship that exists- ceteris paribus-can be expressed as 'distance lends enchant-
ment'.... Distance from the scene of creation is the very source of the solidarity [sic;
solidity?] of scientific facts.
H.M. Collins, Certainty and the Public Understanding of Science: Science on Television, 17
SOC. STUD. SCI. 692 (1987).
140. THEODRIC ROMEYN BECK & JOHN B. BECK, ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE 906 (10th ed. 1851).
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according to our appearance when summoned to the courts to testi-
fy."', 41 It is unlikely that the public really did judge all doctors on the
basis of the few who served as expert witnesses. Physicians practiced
in homes and hospitals more frequently than in courtrooms, and the
public probably learned to differentiate between these roles. But it is
certainly significant that at the turn of the century, a period long
touted as the heyday of popular enthusiasm for scientific and med-
ical expertise, an extremely prominent type of medical expert had an
extremely bad public image. The situation indicates fissures in the
ideology of the expert and limitations to the cultural authority of
science and medicine.
141. Algernon T. Bristow, The Present Status of the MedicalExpert, 42 JAMA 627 (1904).
A JAMA editorial made a very similar point:
Every act of [the expert] tends to raise or lower in the public estimation the prestige and
influence of the body of scholars with whom he is associated.... We appeal for a higher
standard in this important field in which science has an opportunity to interpret itself to
the community by making evident its disinterestedness.
Editorial, The Ethics of Expert Testimony, 62 JAMA 1970, 1970-71 (1914).
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